Federal Judges
American Corner | 2013-02-01 17:20

The first African American Supreme Court Justice, Thurgood Marshall, with President Lyndon B. Johnson. (© Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

(The following article is taken from the U.S. Department of State publication, Outline of the U.S. Legal System.)
 
The main actors in the federal system are the men and women who serve as judges and justices. What characteristics do these people have that distinguish them from the rest of the citizenry? What are the qualifications – both formal and informal – for appointment to the bench? How are judges selected and who are the participants in the process? How do judges learn to be judges? How are judges disciplined and when are they removed from the bench?
 
BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL JUDGES
Americans cling to the notion that someone born in the humblest of circumstances (such as Abraham Lincoln) may one day grow up to be the president of the United States, or at least a U.S. judge. As with most myths, this one has a kernel of truth. In principle virtually anyone can become a prominent public official, and a few well-known examples can be cited of people who came from poor backgrounds yet climbed to the pinnacle of power. More typically, however, America's federal judges, like other public officials and the captains of commerce and industry, come from the nation's middle and upper-middle classes.
 
District Judges
Background data for all federal district judges for the past 210 years have never been collected, but a good deal is known about judges who have served in recent decades.
 
Before assuming the federal bench, a plurality of judges had been judges at the state or local level. The next largest blocs were employed either in the political or governmental realms or in moderate- to large-sized law firms. Those working in small law firms or as professors of law made up the smallest bloc.
 
Judges' educational background reveals something of their elite nature. All graduated from college; about half attended either costly Ivy League schools or other private universities to receive their undergraduate and law degrees. Judges also differ from the population as a whole in that there is a strong tendency toward "occupational heredity" – that is, for judges to come from families with a tradition of judicial and public service.
 
Although the United States is about 51 percent female, judges have been almost exclusively male. Until the presidency of Jimmy Carter (1977-81), less than 2 percent of district judges were female, and even with conscious effort to change this phenomenon, only 14.4 percent of Carter's appointments to district judgeships were women. Racial minorities also have been underrepresented on the trial bench, not only in absolute numbers but also in comparison with figures for the overall population. Until the present time, only Jimmy Carter had appointed a significant number of non-Anglos to the federal bench – over 21 percent. During the administration of President Bill Clinton (1993-2001), a dramatic change took place. During his first six years in office, 49 percent of his judicial appointees were either women or minorities.
 
About nine out of 10 district judges have been of the same political party as the appointing president, and historically about 60 percent have a record of active partisanship.
 
The typical judge has been 49 years old at the time of appointment. Age variations from one presidency to another have been small, with no discernible trend over the years from one administration to another.
 
Appeals Court Judges
Appeals judges are much more likely to have previous judicial experience than their counterparts on the trial court bench, and they are just as likely, if not more so, to have attended private and Ivy League schools.
 
In terms of political party affiliation, little difference is seen between trial and appellate court appointments. However, appeals judges have a slight tendency to be more active in their respective parties than their colleagues on the trial bench.
 
The Clinton initiative to make the bench more accurately reflect U.S. gender and racial demographics is evident in the ranks of the appellate judges as well. A third of his appointees were women, and more African-Americans, Hispanics, and Asians were appointed to the appellate court bench by Clinton than by any other president.
 
President George W. Bush, in turn, also has shown a commitment to racial and gender diversity. Almost one-third of his district court appointments, for example, have been "non-traditional" – women and minorities.
 
Supreme Court Justices
Since 1789, 106 men and two women have sat on the bench of America's highest judicial tribunal. Although perhaps 10 percent of the justices were of essentially humble origin, a majority of the justices came from politically active families, and about a third were related to jurists and closely connected with families with a tradition of judicial service.
 
Until the 1960s the High Court had been all white and all male, but in 1967 President Lyndon Johnson appointed Thurgood Marshall as the first African American member of the Court. When Marshall retired in 1991, President George H.W. Bush, father of President George W. Bush, replaced him with another African American, Clarence Thomas. In 1981 the gender barrier was broken when President Ronald Reagan named Sandra Day O'Connor to the Court, and 13 years later she was joined by Ruth Bader Ginsburg.
 
As for the nonpolitical occupations of the justices, all 108 had legal training and all had practiced law at some stage in their careers. Only 22 percent had state or federal judicial experience immediately prior to their appointments, although more than half had served on the bench at some time before their nomination to the Supreme Court. As with their colleagues in the lower federal judiciary, the justices were much more likely to have been politically active than the average American, and virtually all shared many of the ideological and political orientations of their appointing president.
 
QUALIFICATIONS OF FEDERAL JUDGES
Despite the absence of formal qualifications for a federal judgeship, there are well-defined informal requirements.
 
Formal Qualifications
No constitutional or statutory qualifications are stipulated for serving on the Supreme Court or the lower federal courts. The Constitution merely indicates that "the judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court" as well as in any lower federal courts that Congress may establish (Article III, Section 1) and that the president "by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint...Judges of the supreme Court" (Article II, Section 2). Congress has applied the same selection procedure to the appeals and the trial courts. There are no exams to pass, no minimum age requirement, no stipulation that judges be native-born citizens or legal residents, no requirement that judges even have a law degree.
 
Informal Requirements
At least four vital although informal factors determine who sits on the federal bench in America: professional competence, political qualifications, self-selection, and the element of luck.
 
Professional Competence: Although candidates for U.S. judicial posts do not have to be attorneys, it has been the custom to appoint lawyers who have distinguished themselves professionally. Although the political rules may allow a president to reward an old ally with a seat on the bench, tradition has created an expectation that the would-be judge have some reputation for professional competence, the more so as the judgeship in question goes from the trial court to the appeals court to the Supreme Court level.
 
Political Qualifications: Most nominees for judicial office have some record of political activity for two reasons. First, to some degree judgeships are still considered part of the political patronage system; those who have served the party are more likely to be rewarded with a federal post than those who have not. Second, some political activity on the part of the would-be judge is often necessary, because otherwise the candidate would simply not be visible to the president, senator(s),or local party leaders who send forth the names of candidates.
 
Self-Selection: While many consider it undignified and lacking in judicial temperament for someone to announce publicly a desire for a federal judgeship, some would-be jurists orchestrate discreet campaigns on their own behalf or at least pass the word that they are available for judicial service. Few will admit to seeking an appointment actively, but credible anecdotes suggest that attorneys often position themselves in such a way that their names will come up when there is a vacant seat to fill.
 
The Element of Luck: A good measure of happenstance exists in virtually all judicial appointments. Being a member of the right party at the right time or being visible to the power brokers at the right moment often has as much to do with becoming a judge as one's professional background.
 
THE FEDERAL SELECTION PROCESS AND ITS PARTICIPANTS
The framework of judicial selection is the same for all federal judges, although the roles of the participants vary depending on the level of the U.S. judiciary. All nominations are made by the president after due consultation with the White House staff, the attorney general's office, certain senators, and other political operatives. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), an arm of the Justice Department, customarily performs a routine security check. After the nomination is announced to the public, various interest groups that believe they have a stake in the appointment may lobby for or against the candidate. Also, the candidate's qualifications will be evaluated by a committee of the American Bar Association. The candidate's name is sent to the Senate Judiciary Committee, which conducts an investigation of the nominee's fitness for the post. If the committee's vote is favorable, the nomination is sent to the floor of the Senate, where it is either approved or rejected by a simple majority vote.
 
The President
Technically, the president nominates all judicial candidates, but historically the chief executive has been more involved in appointments to the Supreme Court than to the lower courts. This is so for two major reasons.
 
First, Supreme Court appointments are seen by the president – and by the public at large – as generally more important and politically significant than openings on the lesser tribunals. Presidents often use their few opportunities for High Court appointments to make a political statement or to set the tone of their administration. For example, during the period of national stress prior to U.S. entry into World War II, Democratic President Franklin D. Roosevelt elevated Republican Harlan Fiske Stone to chief justice as a gesture of national unity. In 1969 President Richard Nixon used his appointment of the conservative Warren Burger to fulfill his campaign pledge to restore "law and order." And President Ronald Reagan in 1981 hoped to dispel his reputation for being unsympathetic toward the women's movement by being the first to name a woman to the High Court.
 
A second reason why presidents are likely to devote more attention to Supreme Court appointments and less to lower court appointments is that tradition has allowed for individual senators and local party leaders to influence, and often dominate, lower court appointments. The practice known as senatorial courtesy is part of the appointment process for district judges. Under senatorial courtesy, senators of the president's political party who are from the home state of the nominee are asked their opinions of the candidate by the Senate Judiciary Committee. In expressing their views about a particular candidate, these senators are in a position to virtually veto a nomination. Senatorial courtesy does not apply to appellate court appointments, although it is customary for presidents to defer to senators of their party from states that make up the appellate court circuit.
 
The Department of Justice
Assisting the president and the White House staff in the judicial selection process are the two key presidential appointees in the Justice Department – the attorney general of the United States and the deputy attorney general. Their primary job is to seek out candidates for federal judicial posts who conform to general criteria set by the president. Once several names are obtained, the staff of the Justice Department will subject each candidate to further scrutiny. They may order an FBI investigation of the candidate's character and background; they will usually read copies of all articles or speeches the candidate has written or evaluate a sitting judge's written opinions; they might check with local party leaders to determine that the candidate is a party faithful and is in tune with the president's major public policy positions.
 
In the case of district judge appointments, where names are often submitted by home-state senators, the Justice Department's function is more that of screener than of initiator. Regardless of who comes up with a list of names, the Justice Department's primary duty is to evaluate the candidate's personal, professional, and political qualifications. In performing this role the department may work closely with the White House staff, with the senators involved in the nomination, and with party leaders who may wish to have some input in choosing the nominee.
 
State and Local Party Leaders
Regional party leaders have little to say in the appointment of Supreme Court justices, where presidential prerogative is dominant, and their role in the choice of appeals court judges is minimal. However, in the selection of U.S. trial judges their impact is formidable, especially when appointments occur in states in which neither senator is of the president's political party. In such cases the president will be more likely to consult with state leaders of his own party rather than with the state's senators.
 
Interest Groups
A number of pressure groups in the United States, representing the whole political spectrum from left to right, often lobby either for or against judicial nominations. Leaders of these groups – civil liberties, business, organized labor, civil rights – have little hesitation about urging the president to withdraw the nomination of someone whose political and social values are different from their own or about lobbying the Senate to support the nomination of someone who is favorably perceived. Interest groups lobby for and against nominees at all levels of the federal judiciary.
 
The American Bar Association (ABA)
For more than five decades, the Committee on the Federal Judiciary of the ABA has played a key role in evaluating the professional credentials of potential nominees for positions on the federal bench. The committee, whose 15 members represent all the U.S. circuits, evaluates candidates on the basis of three criteria: judicial temperament, professional competence, and integrity. A candidate approved by the committee is rated either "qualified" or "well qualified," whereas an unacceptable candidate is stamped with a "not qualified" label.
 

Two federal judges presiding over a naturalization ceremony. (© Syracuse Newspapers/The Image Works)

The Senate Judiciary Committee
Two federal judges presiding over a naturalization ceremony. (© Syracuse Newspapers/The Image Works)
The rules of the Senate require its Judiciary Committee to consider all nominations to the federal bench and to make recommendations to the Senate as a whole. Its role is thus to screen individuals who have already been nominated, not to suggest names of possible candidates. The committee holds hearings on all nominations, at which time witnesses are heard and deliberations take place behind closed doors. The hearings for district court appointments are largely perfunctory because the norm of senatorial courtesy has, for all intents and purposes, already determined whether the candidate will be acceptable to the Senate. However, for appeals court nominees – and surely for an appointment to the Supreme Court – the committee hearing is a serious proceeding.

The Senate
The final step in the judicial appointment process for federal judges is a majority vote by the Senate. Historically, two general views have prevailed of the Senate's prescribed role. Presidents from the time of George Washington and a few scholars have taken the position that the Senate ought quietly to go along with the presidential choices unless overwhelmingly strong reasons exist to the contrary. Other scholars and most senators have held the view that the Senate has the right and the obligation to make its own decision regarding the nominee. In practice the role of the Senate in the judicial confirmation process has varied, depending on the level of the federal judgeship that is being considered.
 
For district judges the norm of senatorial courtesy prevails. That is, if the president's nominee is acceptable to the senator(s) of the president's party in the state in which the judge is to sit, the Senate is usually happy to confirm the appointment. For appointments to the appeals courts, senatorial courtesy does not apply, since the vacancy to be filled covers more than just the state of one or possibly two senators. But senators from each state in the circuit in which the vacancy has occurred customarily submit names of possible candidates to the president. An unwritten rule is that each state in the circuit should have at least one judge on that circuit's appellate bench. As long as the norms are adhered to and the president's nominee has reasonably good qualifications, the Senate as a whole usually goes along with the recommendations of the chief executive.
 
The Senate has been inclined to dispute the president if disagreement arises over a nominee's fitness for the High Court. Since 1789, presidents have sent the names of 144 Supreme Court nominees to the Senate for its advice and consent. Of this number, 30 were either rejected or "indefinitely postponed" by the Senate, or the names were withdrawn by the president. Thus presidents have been successful about 79 percent of the time, and their success rate seems to be improving, given that as many as one-third of the nominations were rejected by the Senate in the 19th century. The record shows that presidents have met with the most success in getting their High Court nominations approved when the nominee comes from a noncontroversial background and has middle-of-the-road political leanings, and when the president's party also controls the Senate, or at least a majority shares the president's basic attitudes and values.
 
THE JUDICIAL SOCIALIZATION PROCESS
In college and law school, future judges acquire important analytic and communication skills, in addition to the basic substance of the law. After a couple of decades of legal practice, the future judge has learned a good bit about how the courts and the law actually work and has specialized in several areas of the law. Despite all this preparation, sometimes called "anticipatory socialization," most new judges in America still have a lot to learn about being a judge.
 
Not only does the United States lack formalized training procedures for the judicial profession, but there is an assumption that being a lawyer for a decade or so is all the experience one needs to be a judge. On the contrary, becoming a judge in America requires a good deal of freshman socialization (short-term learning and adjustment to the new role) and occupational socialization (on-the-job training over a period of years).
 
Typical new trial court appointees may be first-rate lawyers and experts in a few areas of the law in which they have specialized. As judges, however, they are expected to be experts on all legal subjects, are required to engage in judicial duties usually unrelated to any tasks they performed as lawyers (for example, sentencing), and are given a host of administrative assignments for which they have had no prior experience (for example, learning how to docket efficiently several hundred diverse cases).
 
At the appeals court level there is also a period of freshman socialization – despite the circuit judge's possible prior judicial experience – and former trial judges appear to make the transition more easily. During the transition time, circuit judges tend to speak less for the court than their more experienced colleagues. They often take longer to write opinions, defer more often to senior colleagues, or experience a period of indecision.
 
The learning process for new Supreme Court justices is even harder. As with new appeals court judges, novice Supreme Court justices tend to defer to senior associates, to write fewer majority and dissenting opinions, and to manifest a degree of uncertainty. New High Court appointees may have more judicial experience than their lower-court colleagues, but the fact that the Supreme Court is involved in broad judicial policy making – as opposed to the error correction of the appeals courts and the norm enforcement of the trial courts – may account for their initial indecisiveness.
 
Given the need on the part of all new federal jurists for both freshman and occupational socialization, where do they go for instruction? For both the appeals court judges and their trial court peers, most of their training comes from their more senior, experienced colleagues on the bench – particularly the chief judge of the circuit or district. Likewise on the Supreme Court, older associates, often the chief justice, play a primary part in passing on to novice justices the essential rules and values of the Court.
 
Training seminars provided by the Federal Judicial Center for newly appointed judges also play an important role in the training and socialization of new jurists. Although some of these seminars are conducted by outsider specialists – subject matter experts in the law schools – the key instructors tend to be seasoned judges whose real-life experience on the bench commands the respect of the new members of the federal judiciary.
 
What is the significance of this socialization process for the operation of the U.S. judicial-legal system? First, the agents of socialization that are readily available to the novice jurists allow the system to operate more smoothly, with a minimum of down time. If new judges were isolated from their more experienced associates, geographically or otherwise, they would require more time to learn the fine points of their trade and presumably a greater number of errors would occur in litigation.
 
Second, the fact that the system is able to provide its own socialization – that the older, experienced jurists train the novices – serves as a sort of glue that helps bond the system together. It allows the judicial values, practices, and orientations of one generation of judges to be passed on to another. It gives continuity and a sense of permanence to a system that operates in a world where chaos and random behavior are common.
 
THE RETIREMENT AND REMOVAL OF JUDGES
Judges cease performing their judicial duties when they retire by choice or because of ill health or death, or when they are subjected to the disciplinary actions of others.
 
Disciplinary Action Against Federal Judges
All federal judges appointed under the provisions of Article III of the Constitution hold office "during good Behavior," which means in effect for life or until they choose to step down. The only way they can be removed from the bench is by impeachment (indictment by the House of Representatives) and conviction by the Senate. In accordance with constitutional requirements (for Supreme Court justices) and legislative standards (for appeals and trial court judges), impeachment may occur for "Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." An impeached jurist would face trial in the Senate, which could convict by a vote of two-thirds of the members present.
 
Since 1789 the House of Representatives has initiated impeachment proceedings against only 13 jurists – although about an equal number of judges resigned just before formal action was taken against them. Of these 13 cases, only seven resulted in a conviction, which removed them from office.
 
Although outright acts of criminality by those on the bench are few, a gray area of misconduct may put offending judges somewhere between acceptable and impeachable behavior. What to do with the federal jurist who hears a case despite an obvious conflict of interest, who consistently demonstrates biased behavior in the courtroom, whose personal habits negatively affect his or her performance in court? Historically, little has been done in such cases other than issuance of a mild reprimand by colleagues. In recent decades, however, actions have been taken to discipline judges.
 
On October 1, 1980, a new statute of Congress took effect. Titled the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act, the law has two distinct parts. The first part authorizes the Judicial Council in each circuit, composed of both appeals and trial court judges and presided over by the chief judge of the circuit, to "make all necessary and appropriate orders for the effective and expeditious administration of justice within its circuit." The second part of the act establishes a statutory complaint procedure against judges. Briefly, it permits an aggrieved party to file a written complaint with the clerk of the appellate court. The chief judge then reviews the charge and may dismiss it if it appears frivolous, or for a variety of other reasons. If the complaint seems valid, the chief judge must appoint an investigating committee consisting of himself or herself and an equal number of trial and circuit court judges. After an inquiry the committee reports to the council, which has several options: the judge may be exonerated; if the offender is a bankruptcy judge or magistrate, he or she may be removed; and an Article III judge may be subject to private or public reprimand or censure, certification of disability, request for voluntary resignation, or prohibition against further case assignments. However, removal of an Article III judge is not permitted; impeachment is still the only recourse. If the council determines that the conduct might constitute grounds for impeachment, it will notify the Judicial Conference, which in turn may transmit the case to the U.S. House of Representatives for consideration.
 
Disability of Federal Judges
Perhaps more problematic than removing jurists for misconduct is the removal of those who have become too old and infirm to carry out their judicial responsibilities effectively. Congress has tried with some success to tempt the more senior judges into retirement by making it financially more attractive to do so. Since 1984 federal judges have been permitted to retire with full pay and benefits under what is called the rule of 80; that is, when the sum of a judge's age and number of years on the bench is 80. Congress has also permitted judges to go on senior status instead of accepting full retirement. In exchange for a reduced caseload they are permitted to retain their office and staff and – equally important – the prestige and self-respect of being an active judge.
 
Judges often time their resignations to occur when their party controls the presidency so that they will be replaced by a jurist of similar political and judicial orientation. A 1990 study found that especially since 1954, "judicial retirement/resignation rates have been strongly influenced by political/ideological considerations, and infused with partisanship," thus indicating that many jurists view themselves as part of a policy link between the people, the judicial appointment process, and the subsequent decisions of the judges and justices.
 
QUALIFICATIONS AND BACKGROUNDS OF STATE JUDGES
Most state laws and constitutions provide few rigid conditions for being a state judge. The vast majority of the states do not require their justices of the peace or magistrates to have law degrees, but such degrees are virtually required (either formally or in practice) for trial and appellate judges.
 
Although women constitute a slight majority of the American population and despite the upsurge in recent decades in the number of women in the legal profession, women are still underrepresented on the bench. Those who do serve as state jurists are much more likely to serve at the lower levels of the state judiciary than on the supreme courts, although this varies greatly from one state to the next. As of the mid-1990s, only about 14 percent of all state judges were women and 6 percent were either African American, Hispanic, or Asian American.
 
State judges, like their federal counterparts, have generally stayed in the region where they grew up and were educated. About three-fourths of all state jurists were born in the state in which they serve, and less than a third went out of state for their undergraduate degrees or for their law degrees. This penchant for localism is also reflected in the patterns of work experience that state judges bring to the bench. For example, of those serving on the state supreme court bench, only 13 percent have any prior federal experience, whereas 93 percent have some type of prior state experience.
 
Judges tend to be middle-aged when they assume the bench. State trial judges come to the bench at about age 46, which corresponds roughly to the figure of 49 for federal trial judges. State appellate court judges tend to be slightly older than their trial court colleagues when they become jurists – about 53, which is approximately the same as their federal equivalents.
 
In terms of political party affiliation, state judges, whether they be elected or appointed, tend to mirror the party that dominates in the judge's state. Also, the vast majority of state judges had been politically active before assuming the bench, whether they were elected to the bench or appointed by a governor.
 
Over half the state trial judges come to the bench from the private practice of law, and about a quarter were elevated from a lower court judgeship, such as a magistrate's position. Of those who practiced law, most reported a general practice without specialization. About one in five was recruited from the ranks of district attorneys, and only 3 percent come from private criminal law practice. Of those serving on state supreme courts, almost two-thirds came from the ranks of the intermediate appellate courts or from the state trial courts.
 
THE SELECTION PROCESS FOR STATE JUDGES
At the state level a variety of methods are used to select jurists, and each of these has many permutations. Basically, there are five routes to a judgeship in any one of the 50 states: partisan election, nonpartisan election, merit selection, gubernatorial appointment, and appointment by the legislature.
 
Election of Judges
The election of judges, on either a partisan or a nonpartisan ballot, is the norm in the states. This method became popular during the time of President Andrew Jackson (1829-37), an era when Americans sought to democratize the political process. In practice, however, political party leaders often regard judicial elections as indirect patronage to reward the party faithful. Also, judges who must run for election are often forced to solicit campaign contributions from the lawyers and law firms that will eventually appear before them in court – a potential source of conflict of interest. Finally, voter turnout in judicial elections is extremely low. Voters may know whom they prefer for president or member of Congress or state senator, but they may be unfamiliar with the persons running for state judgeships.
 
As part of the Progressive movement at the turn of the 20th century, reformers sought to take some of the partisanship out of judicial elections by having judges run on a nonpartisan basis. In principle they would run on their ideas and qualifications, not on the basis of which party they belonged to. But even in these technically nonpartisan states, the political parties endorse individual judicial candidates and contribute to their campaigns so that the candidates acquire identification with one political party or another.
 
Merit Selection
Merit selection has been in use since the early 1900s as a preferred method of selecting judges. The first state fully to adopt such a method was Missouri in 1940, and ever since such schemes have come to be known as generic variants of "the Missouri Plan."
 
The states with Missouri-type plans use a combination of elections and appointments. The governor appoints a judge from among several candidates recommended by a nominating panel of five or more people, usually including attorneys (often chosen by the local bar association), nonlawyers appointed by the governor, and sometimes a senior local judge. Either by law or by implicit agreement, the governor appoints someone from the recommended list. After serving for a short period of time, often a year, the newly appointed judge must stand for a special election, at which time he or she in effect runs on his or her record. (The voters are asked, "Shall Judge X be retained in office?") If the judge's tenure is supported by the voters, as is virtually always the case, the judge will serve for a regular and fairly long term.
 
Gubernatorial Appointment and Legislative Appointment
Today, judges are chosen by the governor or by the state legislature in only a handful of states. When judges are appointed by the governor, politics almost invariably comes into play. Governors tend to select individuals who have been active in state politics and whose activity has benefited either the governor personally or the governor's political party or allies. Also, in making judicial appointments the governor often bargains with local political leaders or with state legislators whose support he or she needs. A governor may also use a judgeship to reward a legislator or local politician who has given faithful political support in the past.
 
Only a few states still allow their legislators to appoint state judges. Although a variety of criteria may be used in choosing members of the state supreme courts, when it comes to filling the state trial benches, state legislators tend to turn to former members of the legislature.
 
THE RETIREMENT AND REMOVAL OF JUDGES
Judges who are too old or unfit to serve seem to be less of a problem at the state level than at the federal level. A number of states have mandatory retirement plans. Minimum ages for retirement range from 65 to 75, with 70 being the most common. Some states have declining retirement benefit plans for judges who serve beyond the desired tenure; that is, the longer judges stay on the bench, the lower their retirement benefits.
 
Retirement plans, no matter how effective in getting the older judge to resign, are of little use against the younger jurist who is incompetent, corrupt, or unethical. Throughout American history the states have used procedures such as impeachment, recall elections, and concurrent resolutions of the legislature to dismiss these judges. These methods were only minimally effective, however, either because they proved to be politically difficult to put into operation or because of their time-consuming, cumbersome nature.
 
More recently, the states have begun to set up special commissions, often made up of the judges themselves, to police their own members. Such commissions are not always effective, however, because judges are often loath to expose a colleague to public censure and discipline.
 
 [Chapters 1 through 8 are adapted with permission from the book Judicial Process in America, 5th edition, by Robert A. Carp and Ronald Stidham, published by Congressional Quarterly, Inc. Copyright © 2001 Congressional Quarterly Inc. All rights reserved.]
美闻网---美国生活资讯门户
©2012-2014 Bywoon | Bywoon