With the heralded handover of power in Iraq from Americans to Iraqis only five weeks away, arguments over the degree of independence to be accorded to an interim government in Baghdad are hotting up. The UN's envoy to Iraq, Lakhdar Brahimi, is poised to give the Americans a list of Iraqis he thinks suitable for jobs in an interim government due to take over at the end of June. But two of the UN Security Council's five permanent members—France and Russia—are loth to pass a new American-British resolution endorsing the handover until they have vetted Mr Brahimi's list and are satisfied that the Americans are handing Iraqis real power.

The Americans, generals as much as politicians, remain deeply reluctant to lose control on the ground. Most Iraqis and most involved outsiders, however, argue that security will not improve until enough Iraqis are convinced that the big decisions in their country, including strategic military ones, are being taken by Iraqis. To complicate matters more, Britain's Tony Blair, seeking (perhaps for domestic reasons) to put some distance between himself and George Bush, seemed, for the first time over Iraq, to side with the Europeans.

Meanwhile, Mr Brahimi has been trying to choose a plausible team, which he is expected to announce by the end of this month. Its backbone—he has apparently decided—will be provided by members of the current American-appointed Governing Council (GC), the dominant political body in the country under the Americans. A venerable Sunni on the GC, Adnan Pachachi, is still being touted as the likeliest interim president, with little executive power, while a 62-year-old nuclear scientist, Hussain Shahristani, a Shia locked up for 11 years in Abu Ghraib prison under Saddam Hussein, apparently turned down an offer to be prime minister. The new government's first aim will be to prove that it is no mere American stooge.

The Americans have been gradually transferring power to Iraqis for some weeks. Locals now run a dozen ministries, including those in charge of health and education. Their budgets are pretty well covered by oil revenues, now flowing in to the tune of $14 billion a year. The Americans' draft UN resolution grants Iraqis most of the country's financial oversight. This week the port of Umm Qasr is due to be ceremoniously handed over to an Iraqi director-general, while foreign companies have been asked to bid for contracts worth $200m to revamp the harbour in return for getting half of its future income. American aid agencies, however, will continue to spend much of the $33 billion pledged at last year's donors' conference in Madrid.

But the most ticklish issue is security—and who should control it. The latest American idea is for a national security council, on which the new Iraqi defence and interior ministers will sit, alongside the American and British ambassadors and an American general who could veto major military decisions. In a speech this week designed mainly to rally support at home, President Bush, without naming a departure date, said he would keep the present tally of 138,000 American troops in Iraq “as long as necessary”. He also said that America would help train some 260,000 Iraqi soldiers, police and “other security personnel”, while aiming to create a permanent Iraqi army of 35,000.

The Americans say they will closely consult their Iraqi counterparts—until the latter assume full responsibility. But, in the draft UN resolution's words, the (American-led) “multinational force shall have authority to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security” in Iraq, with its mandate due for renewal after a year. There would be a “partnership” between the multinational force and Iraq's “sovereign interim government”.

That sat oddly with Mr Blair's assertion this week that “the ultimate strategic and political decision-making passes to the Iraqi government after June 30th”. Some diplomats sought to square the circle by differentiating between “operational control”, to be kept by the Americans, versus “strategic control” in the hands of Iraqis.

Plainly, that would leave grey areas. The initial American decision two months ago to attack insurgents in Fallujah might have been considered operational but would soon have become strategic and political. It is unclear who would arbitrate in future similar instances. An eventual UN resolution, while giving still more power to Iraqis, may nonetheless leave the Americans with room for manoeuvre. Yet any ambiguity, say pessimists, could store up trouble for a rancorous future. It is inconceivable, in any event, that Mr Bush would let Iraqis give direct orders to his generals.

Mr Brahimi still has hard choices on the political front. Though he is unlikely to offer jobs in the interim government to politicians close to the Shia firebrand leader, Muqtada al-Sadr, who has been stirring up revolt against the American-led coalition, he might recommend that they be included in a “national tent” (a conference of over 1,000 Iraqis) that will in turn elect a consultative council to advise the new government. While holding back from an all-out onslaught, American forces have continued to clobber Mr Sadr's militias here and there; this week, after scores of militiamen had been killed, there were signs they would agree to withdraw from Najaf, the Shias' holiest city.

At the other end of the Iraqi political spectrum, the Americans have dropped Ahmed Chalabi, whom the neo-conservatives in the Pentagon had long promoted as a potential leader of the new Iraq. After a raid on his house in Baghdad by Iraqi police supported by American forces, apparently in an effort to uncover evidence of corruption and to find links with the Iranian intelligence service, Mr Chalabi furiously declared that he had cut off relations with the coalition authority, while denying all the accusations of treachery that are now being thrown at him.

While many of Mr Bush's opponents suspect that the president is preparing a rapid exit strategy from Iraq, he insists he will not cut and run. Judging by this week's speech, Iraq's scheduled general election in January is the crucial date on the Iraqi calendar—more so even than June 30th. Whether it can be reached without the chaos and bloodshed getting worse is painfully uncertain—whoever is truly in charge, Americans or Iraqis.