Historians generally agree that there have been at least seven crucial presidential campaigna in our history. Of these, probably that of l860 was of more importance than any other. It was no ordinary "every-four-year" election contest. It assumed significance owing to its result -- the election of Lincoln, which was a direct cause of the Civil War. It was a four-cornered contest, marked by a deep split in one of the major parties, and the election of a president by a relatively new party. That president was a minority and sectional president.
 
 The setting for the campaign of 1860 requires an understanding of the political situation in the decade of the 1850's.
 
 American elections are established by law to come at stated intervals. They occur when the time comes -- not necessarily when one is needed. Because of our Federal system, we have local, state, and national elections. In the 1850's there was little uniformity for these. Save in January, February, June, and July, there was an American election some time and some place every month of the year. This meant that the voters were subjected to frequent canvasses. If there were no issues, some had to be "manufactured;" if there were explosive issusa, extremists could frequently play up emotional positions. The result was too-frequent political exacerbation. The slavery problem intruded into politics and became such an issue in the 1850's; it was overworked and over-used in the frequent electlona, and it served to keep the voters in a nearly-constant state of violence. It created a state of hyper-tenaion. To some historians, this psychological factor was a major cause of the Civil War.
 
 The accepted American party System is a two-party one, with occasional third parties or "splinter" parties making their appearance from time to time. Prior to 1854, the two dominant parties were the Whigs and Democrats. Both of these were truly national in their membership, not sectional. It was a common mistake to believe that all white Southerners were always Democrats. The Whigs were generally conservative, had originally opposed the extreme policies of Andrew Jackson, and, in the South, performed a valuable function of checking extremists. They stood for compromise, and Henry Clay, the Whig political idol for many Americans, goes down in history as "the Great Pacificator." The major political revolution of the decade of the 1850's was the rapid disintegration of the Whig party following the passage of the Kansas- Nebraska Act of 1854, and the void it created in the two-party system.
 
 Many political groups vied for its place - Know-Nothings, temperance advocates, and anti-slavery partisans of all shades. The old-line Whigs sought political cover under many roofs. Some of them tried out the Know-Nothing party - that anti-Catholic, anti-foreign, "hundred per cent American" party, originating as a secret order and later throwing off its cloak of secrecy. It had a remarkable meteor-like rise and fall. Other old-line Whigs in the South finally found political shelter under the Democratic roof. But many of them in the North found shelter in what later became the Republican party. This Republican party was at first a fushionist one; it did not even have a name, and clumsy labels were often used, such as Anti-Nebraska, or Independent, or even Fusionist. This party was not fused over night, nor even it one or two years; nor was its fusion as rapid in some states as in others. But it had a remerkably rapid rise, and under its roof congregated old-line Whigs, anti-slavery advocates of many stripes, temperance devotees, and many Democrats who believed that the Democrats were too timid on the anti-alavery question. Finally, the name of "Republican," originally used at Jackson, Michigan and Ripon, Wisconsin, was accepted-- Horace Greeley having urged it. That name had the strong force of tradition and patriotism, stemming from Thomas Jefferson's anti-Federalist party, but never tarnished by association with Andrew Jackson.
 
 In 1960 when one observes the well-oiled, smooth-running machinery of the nationa1 Democratic party under the Kennedy operation and the equally smooth purring machinery of the Nixon operators, one is forced to conclude that political party organization has entered the stage where it finally matches our economic machine. But in the 185O's the parties were not highly centralized. Neither the Republicans nor Democrats were strongly organized in the modern sense. The key for an understanding of American political parties, then and now, is at the State level, not at the national level. American political parties were, and still are, essentially a loose federation of state organizations or machines. In national election contests, these state machines had to be put in gear at roughly the same speed, and meshed. It was the state organization that reached down to the gress-root level of ward-healers, precinct committeemen, and party workers.
 
 Mr. Roy F. Nichols in his book on The Disruption of American Democracy found seventy-eight such state machines in the 1850's. There were thirty-one States in 1856, each having two parties, while in sixteen states there was a third machine - a grand total of seventy-eight. This network covered the country. Candidates for the presidency, therefore, had to make deals, trade votes, and make compromises with the managers of these state machines within their party. The smoke-filled room, usually associated with the choice of a presidential nominee in the campaign of 1920, was nothing new to American politics; it was a common scene for such choices even before the Civil War.
 
 In 1860 the Republican party showed an amazing strength for a aeven-year-old. It consisted of an. agglomeration of a number of old Whig machines with new elements added. The managers knew quite well that they could never win a national electior with a party that had only one plank in its platform. Antislavery was too narrow an appeal in the North for any success. Even on this subject there were varying shades of opinion as to the way in which to deal with the problem of slavery. In fact, some of the most fanatical anti-slavery zealots would have no truck with any political party. To place an out-right abolitionist plank in their platform - to take an extremist position on this subject - would not win many votes. The best position would be a moderate one -- to promise to do nothing about slavery in the states where it already existed, but to prevent it from spreading into new terrltories, seemed to be a reasonable position. Their fourth resolution at the Chicago Convention of 1860 read:
 
that the maintenance inviolate of the right of the States, and especially the right of each State to order and control its own domestic institutions according to its own judgment exclusively, is essential to that balance of powers on which the perfection and endurance of our political fabric depends....
 
but
 
we deny the authority of Congress, of a territorial legislature, or of any individual, to give legal existence to slavery in any territory of the United States.
 
 There were many voters, particularly in Pennsylvania and New Jersey, where manufacturing was maturing, who wanted a protective tariff. To win over these voters, a protective tariff plank was inserted in the platform. There were regions in the Great Lakes areas in which a number of towns wanted help from the federal government to improve their harbors. With the acquisition of California and the Oregon country, some ties of communication other than the long voyage around South America or the arduous end perilous ride by wagon train across the prairies and mountains, were needed. Transcontinental railroads and telegraph facilities could supply this need, but the states-rights-minded Democrats had blocked any Federal aid for such works. Now the Republican party stepped forward to advocate such help for internal improvements. Finally, there were the so-called "Dutch planks in the platform. These were included at the insistence of the German--American leaders; endorsement of a Homestead act for actual settlers on the national domain, and no changes in the naturalization laws in the states to reduce the foreign-born vote.
 
In this way the architects of the Republican party built their platform -- something for many blocks of voters who could not expect similar promises from the other major party.
 
A platform, however, wee not as nearly exciting as choosing the nominee for president. There was no lack of aspirants for the presidential nomination at the party convention in the Wigwam at Chicago in May, 1860. No less than seven men hoped the lightning would strike. Mr. Richard Luthin, who has made the most complete study of the Republican campaign of 1860, believes that the nomination of Lincoln in 1860 was a triumph for "availability". He writes:
 
The story of Lincoln'a nomination was essentially the familiar one unfolded in several previous (and later) American national party conventions.
 
The strongest candidate wee William H. Seward of New York. He had strong concentrated support, but beyond this, little backing. Seward had the majority of the votes as long as his opponents remained divided and did not agree on a candidate. But they managed to unite on Abraham Lincoln, a lesser known and less controversial candidate. Expediency or "availability"triumphed.
 
Our best reports of all the national party conventiona of 1860 are from the pen of a reporter and editor of the Cincinnati Commercial - - Murat Halstead. Young Hallstead came to Cincinnati as a graduate of the old Farmers College in College Hill. His reporting was much more than the usual superficial accounts that newspapers gave to their readers. As one historian has written, Halstead reported "in depth" - - a type of reporting that only comes from background knowledge. His accounts of all the conventions were published under the title of Caucuses of 1860, and that is our standard source of knowledge for the conventions. He also had a thesis in his accounts, namely, that the candidate with the greatest support did not win the nominations at the two major conventions; that the will of the rank and file of the party was defeated by the "trading" managers at each convention.
 
The Democrats staged one of the most exciting and dramatic conventions in their history at Charleston, South Caroline in the spring of 1860. The charm of this old Southern city was not of the character to take care of the hundreds of delegates who descended upon the place. Its housing accommodations were inadequate, with the result that the price of rooms was high for those days -five dollars for one room with several beds. The Douglas delegates rented the Hibernian Hall and converted the second floor into a large dormitory with rows of beds. The Mills House placed five guests in one room. To these expenses for the Northern delegates, was added the hardship of the long trip by rail from Washington, D.C. which required ten changes of trains. Delegates from New York, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania came by sea with chartered ships.
 
The strongest man in the party and the beat-known political figure in the country was Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois -- "the Little Giant", or, as others said, "a steam-engine in britches." He was the spokesman for "Young America." His claim for the presidential notion was a strong one, but he had committed the blunder of breaking with the Buchanan administration over the Kansas question, and the administration forces as well as the Southern forces were against his nomination. The Douglas forces, however, had a majority of the convention, since representation was based on the number of voters in each state. But when it came to the important Committee on Resolutions, the Douglas forces could not muster a majority, since representation on the committee was based on two from each state; the South needed only four Northern votes to sustain its position, and it found allies in California and Oregon. It was agreed that the platform would be approved before the nominee would be selected.
 
The majority platform report endorsed the Southern position on the important matter of the position of slavery in the territories; that the Federal government was obligated to protect, if necessary, slave property in all the territories. The minority platform report endorsed the doctrine for which Douglas was known - that of popular sovereignty in the territories. After much oratorical thunder and lightning, the convention accepted the minority report endorsing Douglas' position. Dramatically, the Alabama delegation led the bolters from seven of the deep-South states. A large rump convention was now faced with the selection of a presidential nominee. The Democrats had their traditional two-thirds rule; but how should the two-thirds be interpreted? Two-thirds of the delegates who had not bolted, or two-thirds of the theoretically full convention strength before the bolt? Legalistic reasoning prevailed and the latter rule was adopted, but it made it impossible for the convention to choose a presidential nominee. Thirty-four fruitless ballots were taken, with Douglas always having a majority, but usable to obtain a two-thirds majority. Finally, the frustrated delegates voted to recess and to reconvene at Baltimore.
 
This long convention of nearly a week was a severe financial strain for many delegates; ten dollars per day was too much for them to pay out for a long period. Furthermore, by the end of the week the private stock of whiskey, which the Ohio and Kentucky delegations brought with them, gave out, and they no longer had the comfort of bourbon to keep them going. The great Democratic party - the only truly national party then in existence, had split wide open; it remained to be seen whether this breach could be healed at Baltimore.
 
When the delegates re-assembled at Baltimore in the Front Street Theatre, an incident occurred that was significant. The entire front part of the stage gave way, and those sitting or standing on it were tumbled three feet. Luckily, there were no serious injuries. On hand were the delegates from the very states that had bolted the Charleston Conventlon--claiming their old seats. But the managers of this convention, Douglas controlled, refused to re-seat them; they had forfeited their seats. The bolters, therefore, moved to Richmond, Virginia, where they proceeded to nominate a ticket of their own, with John C. Breckinridge of Kentucky heading it.
 
Meanwhile, the Baltimore convention nominated Stephen A. Douglas and endorsed his favorite popular sovereignty doctrine. Thus, no question can exist that the main responsibility for the disruption of the Democratic party lay with the Southern extremists, and their few Northern aupporters. A clear minority of the Charleston Convention undertook to dictate to the majority what should be in the platform and who the presidential nominee should be. Truly, determined minorities can often rule or disrupt!
 
Baltimore was the scene of another party convention that summer. The Constitutional Union party, a remnant of the old Know-Nothing party and diehard Whigs, fearing both the Southern and Northern extremists, now wanted to put a compromise ticket in the field. This Constitutional Union party has usually been ridiculed by many contemporaries and historians alike as comprising fuzzy, conservative, fuddy-duddies, who were Nervous Nellie's over the extremists of the radical Breckinridge and Lincoln parties. They were nervous, and hoped to prevent the political situation from being seized by extremists. Believing that party platforms mislead and deceive the people, theirs' consisted of only three principles:
 
The Constitution of the country, the Union of the States, and the Enforcement of the Laws.
 
They nominated a highly respected gentleman from Tennessee for president -- John Bell. Although there were two other presidential candidates that year, they represented such splinter parties that they may be disregarded. Texan Unionists nominated Sam Houston for president, and Gerrit Smith was nominated by a small set of anti-slavery and temperance advocates.
 
The canvass itself was an exciting one. At that time, candidates for the presidency stood for office -- they were not expected to run for office; the office sought the man, not the man, the office. Hence, active campaigning wee not considered good taste. The theory was perpetuated long after its substance was gone. Douglas, however, did break this rule, although the pretense was maintained for a time. He announced that he was leaving Chicago to visit his sick mother, who lived in Clifton Springs, New York. He arrived there by way of Memphis, Tennessee and St. Louis, Missouri. In fact, this pretense wee exploded when the Republicans printed dodgers with the question: "Where is my wandering boy tonight?" and signed "Douglas' mother."
 
Lincoln, alone, of all the mayor candidates made no speech and issued no public statement during the campaign. He and his managers agreed that he should say nothing. Although the pressure on him to do so was terrific, he made no public statements, saying that his position had been stated on numerous earlier occasions. He did, however, open an office in the capitol at Springfield, and, with one secretary, received callers. The callers were legion.
 
A spectacular feature of the campaign were the marching clubs--the "Bell Ringers" for the Constitutional Union Party, and the "Wide-Awakes" for the Republicans. At Hartford, Connecticut, on their way from a political rally, the Republican marchers were attacked by a Democrat. A blow from a Republican torch-bearer sent the Democrat reeling. Hence, the name of "Wide-Awake" -- to be "on guard." In order to prevent the oil from the lamps and transparencies, carried by the marchers, from dripping on their clothes, the msrchers wore cape and capes of glazed cloth. The campaign song of the Republicans was "Ain't you glad you joined the Republicans?"
 
The truly pivotal states were New York, Pennsylvania, and Indiana--in the order mentioned. In fact, Lincoln could carry every other Northern State, save New York, and be defeated. New York had the largest number of electoral votes -- thirty-five. There was, what Mr. Nichols, calls an "alluring mathematical possibility" of defeating Lincoln. If the Republicans lost both Pennsylvania and New Jersey, or, lost only New York, Lincoln would not be able to secure an electoral college majority. The election of a President would then be thrown into the House of Representstives where the selection must be made from the three highest candidates, and the voting must be done by states. It is a procedure set up in the Constitution but one that has only been used twice in our history.
 
An analysis of the results of the campaign indicate the following conclusions:
 
1. Lincoln won more than enough electoral votes; out of 303 cast, he won 180, although only 152 were necessary to elect. Every free-atate elector voted for him, except three from New Jersey. Furthermore, Lincoln won by popular majorities, not pluralities, in every free-state except California, Oregon, and New Jersey.
 
2. As far as the popular vote was concerned, Lincoln was a minority president. His three opponents received about one million more votes than he, but they were divided. His popular votes were so distributed that in the most densely-populated states, which had the largest number of electoral votes, he won. It is interesting, however, that in the metropolitan areas of New York and Philadelphia, the majority of votes were cast against Lincoln. In the Northwest, a change of one vote in twenty would have defeated him.
 
3, The border-states cast a heavy vote for the compromise candidates, not for the two extremist candidates. Bell and Douglas had a heavy vote in these states.
 
4. The Republicans did not win a majority in either the House or the Senate. They would have 29 members in the Senate v. 37 others; and 104, in the House v. 129 others.
 
A great deal been written about the voting of the foreign-born in this election. Some historians feel that their vote was the dominant one in determining the election. The conclusions regarding it need to be studied to a far greater degree than they now have, to enable us to reach conclusive answers to this question. It has always been asserted that most of the immigrants settled in the Northwestern atates (Ohio, Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota). The Irish, Germans, and Scandinavians were the most important of the foreign-born groups. They had at first gravitated toward the Democratic party. But its hostility to homestead acts and its close asaociation with slavery, did not satisfy the Germans and Scandinavians. The conclusion is, that the Republicans won them over because of the so-called "Dutch planks" in their platform.
 
But these conclusions do need to be modified. The Irish were not won over; they voted almost as a bloc for Douglas. The religious issue was injected into this campaign. Stephen A. Douglas had married Miss Adele Cutts, a reigning socia1 belle of Washington, D.C. and a Roman Catholic. While Douglas never became a Romanist, their children were reared in that faith. It is probably true that the German-Americans, about one-third of whom were Romanists, continued to vote for Douglas, along with the Irish-Americans.
 
It is true that the most prominent German leaders allied themselves with the Republican party. Carl Schurz, Gustav Koerner, August Willich and Friedrich Haussureck (the lest two, from Cincinnati) were very active in Republican circles. The German-Americans had a great deal of social solidarity, Using their own language, having their own clubs, and moving almost exclusively with others of the same type, they depended on their leaders to explain politics to them. Carl 8churz, who was never overly modest, wrote after the campaign:
 
I have been told that I made Lincoln president. That is, of course, not true . . .
 
But his repetition of the statement inflated his influence. Mr. Joseph Schaefer, who has made a very close study of Wisconsin racial groups, believed that the influence of these German leaders was not as great as had been supposed. He believed that one most reckon with the extreme conservatism of the Germans, their intense loyalty, and the fact that even the Lutheran among them, tended to vote for Douglas, rather than Lincoln. In fact, he wrote that probably five-sixths of the German vote in Wisconsin went to Douglas. If Mr. Schafer's conclusions relating to Wisconsin are true, the other states in which the German vote was a factor, need to be studied.
 
One more question relating to this election needs to be noticed. In the light of history, did the election of Lincoln in 1860 constitute enough of a menace to the South for it to carry out its oft- repeated threat of secession? The Republicans did not have a majority in either house of Congress in 1850-1861, but they had elected a President. A sufficient number of voters in the country bad elected Lincoln, and, for the first time in our history, certain Americana refused to abide by a national election. In the interval between Lincoln's election and his inauguration seven atates from the deep South withdrew from the Union and created the Confederate States of America. Was the election of a President from a sectional party enough of a menace to the other section to shatter the Union? It is not an easy question to answer and there are, naturally, varying answers.
 
Back in 1930 this question was debated by two eminent and respectable American historians -- Mr. Arthur C. Cole and Mr. James G. Hamilton. Mr. Cole believed that the fears of the South in 1860 were exaggerated. He pointed to the Kentucky background of Lincoln and his long affiliation with the Whig party, which was essentially a party of compromise. Mr. Cole believed that if Lincoln carried on his policies and views after 1860, the South would not have reason to fear him. He had always condemned fanaticism. He had "firmly resisted the abolitionist tide." But the South was obsessed by an inferiority complex and defense mechanism.
 
On the other hand, Mr. Hamilton felt that the Republican party had become mere radical by 1860 -- in fact, had become "abolitionized." He believed that Lincoln was regarded by many Republicans as having few qualities of leadership, and could be guided by the more radical and extreme members of his party. Be believed that more aggression against slavey would have followed Lincoln's election - so indeed, it did follow his election; witness the Emancipation Proclamation and the Thirteenth Amendment.
 
Still another student of the period, Mr. Roy Nichols, believed that the Southern leaders feared the loss of their political power more than anything else. As he says:
 
They would lose their preferred position in Washington; that was bad enough, but it was not their greatest dread. Their very real and often over-looked fear was loss of power at home . . . It might stir up the submerged whites . . . If elected, Lincoln would have the Federal patronage at his command. He would be appointing a postmaster in every community. Where would he find the men? Not among the aristocracy, not among the fire-eaters, not among the Democrats. Might they not be men of his own humble origin?
 
What was feared, then, wee a shift of power in the South from the governing class to the poorer farmers - - the red-necks, the one-gallus men, from the piney-wooda regions and back-country. By withdrawing from the Union, they could maintain their dominant position at home, whereas, within the Union, it would be undermined by a President of the opposing party.
 
One hundred years after, another presidential campaign is being fought. The issues are different, although a few still can be traced to those in 1860. The issue of slavery is of course dead; but the descendants of the slaves are still with us. After enjoying some civil and political rights for a hundred years, both parties now seek to extend to them full civil rights. Related to this extension of civil rights is another issue -- that of states rights. Certain sections of the country still resist the encroachment of the central government in this area of state or reserved rights. Federal aid for internal improvements has long ago been settled. Now, instead of internal improvements, it is Federal aid for the aged, medical expense for the aged, and Federal aid for education. Differences in degree rather than in kind seem to divide the parties now. But of one thing we are certain, whoever is elected President will not spark a secession movement.